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During what has become one of the great merger waves of American
history, narrow judicial constructions of the Clayton Act have allowed
conglomerate mergers to proceed virtually unchecked. Proposed legisla-
tion1 introduced by Senators Kennedy and Metzenbaum (and others), and
similar proposals by the Antitrust Division and the Chairman and staff of
the Federal Trade Commission, would alter the present highly permissive
merger policy. The proposals differ in important details, but all are
founded on a common concern that an upper limit be placed on corporate
growth through merger; each would impose a limitation based on the
absolute size of the merging firms. Relying on the political and social
rationale of antitrust policy, the legislation evokes sharp dissents from
those who object to the inclusion in antitrust policy of any value other than
allocative efficiency. But to heed such objections would be to turn from an
ideal that has animated 90 years of antitrust development: the view that
antitrust policy is more than a narrowly materialistic path to increased
output; that it encompasses also the ideal that social and economic power
should be limited; and that it thereby expresses a value of fundamental,
even constitutional, dimension.2
* Professor of Law, Boston University. This article is based on the author's testimony at
hearings before the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly on S. 600, given May 17,1979.
The author has served as a consultant to both the Federal Trade Commission in connection with
conglomerate merger legislation, and to private interests in particular merger proceedings. The view
expressed here, however, are entirely his own. I am much indebted to my colleagues Richard M.
Pearson and Alan L. Feld for comments, and to Virginia Gibson-Mason for research.
1. S. 600, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
2. A "constitutional" policy expresses a value that is permanent, of fundamental social
importance, and that usually has proved durable over time; it includes policies that are not in the text of
the constitution itself which have such quality. See Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 34
CoLuM. L. REv. 1, 28-31 (1934). By this standard the Sherman Act can be described as constitutional,
as seen in its adoption, see generally, E. KIRKLAND, HisTORY oF AtFRICAN Ecoo.ttc LIFE (1939)
(near-unanimous passage of Sherman Act as expression of the "general will"), cited in A. PAUL,
CONSERVATIVE CRISES AND THE RULE OF LAW (1960), at 2.; in its continued reaffirmation in statutes and
publiepolicy, seeT. ARNoLD, FAIR FIGHMs AND FoUL (1960), reprintedin 10 ANTITRUST BULL. 655,657
(1965) (Sherman Act of "extraordinary elasticity . . . it is like a constitutional provision rather than
an ordinary statute . . ."); and in the Supreme Court's explicit recognition of its constitutional
quality. See Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1955) (Sherman Act as "a
comprehensive charter of economic liberty"); Appalachian Coal, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344,
360 (1933) ("a generality and adaptability comparable to that found to be desirable in constitutional
provisions") United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596,610 (1972) (Sherman Act"the Magna
Carta of free enterprise . . . as important to the preservation of economic freedom and our free-
enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to . . . fundamental personal freedoms"). See generally
Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. Ray. 1051,1061 n.31 (1979); and Schwartz,
"Justice" and Other Non-Economic Goals of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 1076, 1078 (1979)
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The constitutional character of antitrust is so central to the historic
evolution and development of antitrust policy that without it it is difficult
to imagine that American antitrust could have emerged as the strong force
that it is. The real question posed by noneconomic values in antitrust is
how far such values can be pursued at acceptable economic cost; this is the
crucial issue raised by the proposed legislation. This paper attempts to
show that conglomerate merger legislation is necessary to give modern
expression to the social and political values of antitrust, and that such
legislation can be enacted without substantial economic cost. This does not
mean that the legislation in its present form is flawless; indeed, this article
will suggest that it be pared down so that it affects only the largest
corporate mergers.
I. THE EVENTS LEADING TO THE LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS
Two crucial developments precipitated the 1979 merger proposals:
first, a swiftly accelerating pace of large mergers, and second, a
fundamental shift in merger policy by the Supreme Court. Both are recent
developments, and together they preclude any effective check to the
current wave of mergers unless legislative action is taken.
The magnitude of current merger activity can be quickly sketched. It
is predominantly a large firm merger movement; it is of major dimensions
with few historic parallels; and it continued through 1979.3 Acquisitions in
1978 totalled over $34 billion, a fifty-six percent increase over 1977, itself a
peak merger year. Indeed, current merger activity is comparable to only
two other periods in American history: the great merger consolidations of
1899-1901 and the conglomerate merger frenzy of 1967-68. 4 Significantly,
the present merger movement involves the purchase not of faltering firms,
but of successful companies at large premiums over market value; and the
purchase price is paid not in the debentures and preferred stock favored in
the 1960s, but more often in hard cash.
Facing the mounting tide of large conglomerate mergers, the
enforcement agencies have found themselves virtually powerless.
Restrictive judicial decisions have made it all but impossible for the
agencies to effectively challenge conglomerate mergers, however large. As
the Attorney General noted in a recent report to the President and the
Congress, existing law is simply "unsatisfactory," for in the period of
increased conglomerate merger activity since 1973, and despite twelve
(incorporation as essential value in U.S. occupation policies seeking democratization of Germany and
Japan after World War II).
3. W. T. Grimm & Co., Press Release, Oct. 17, 1979, cited in Remarks of Kenneth M. Davidson
Before the American Appraisal Seminar on Mergers and Acquisitions I (White Plains N.Y. Nov, 6,
1979).
4. Mergers and Industrial Concentration: Hearings on S. 600 Before the Subcommittee on Anti-
trust and Monopoly of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 136 (Pt. 2 1979)
(statement of F. M. Scherer) [hereinafter cited as S. 600 Subcommittee Hearings].
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successive attempts by the government, "there has not been a successfully
litigated conglomerate merger challenge."5
The reason for this dismal enforcement record is a fundamental shift
in viewpoint by the Supreme Court. From its inception antitrust policy
in this country has sought to effect two distinct social values: economic
efficiency, and diversity and diffusion of economic power. But that duality
of 'values has been shattered by recent conglomerate merger decisions of
the Supreme Court.6 From these decisions it seems clear that the present
Court places little weight on nonefficiency values, especially in connection
with conglomerate mergers. Since the efficiency rationale for even the-
conglomerate merger rules that now exist, for example, the potential
competition doctrine, is weaker than for horizontal and vertical mergers.
The failure to recognize the broader political and social goals of anti-
trust has been fatal to effective merger policy. Under these circum-
stances there is virtually no prospect that the present Court will adopt
effective rules to regulate conglomerate mergers. But this has not always
been the case. In the 1960s the Supreme Court made a strong effort to begin
to work out standards for conglomerate mergers.7 While in the afterlight of
exacting scholarship these early efforts can be faulted, they were a
beginning, and most importantly they gave range for the lower courts to
undertake the careful case-by-case development necessary to evolve a
considered policy for conglomerate mergers.
The details of the subsequent downfall of conglomerate merger policy
can be quickly sketched. Shorn of their broader social-political rationales,
conglomerate merger theories have been interpreted narrowly.8 Effective
5. REPORT OFTHE ATTORNEY GENERAL PURSUANTTO SECTION 10(C) OFTIIE SMALL BusiN Ess Aa,
As AMENDED 16 (June 20, 1979) [hereinafter cited as Ar'. GENERAL 1979 SMtALL BUStNESS REPORT].
6. See United States v. Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. 602 (1974); United States v. Falstaff
Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526 (1973); and Brodley, Potential Competition Mergers: A Structural
Synthesis, 87 YALE L. J. 1, 10-19 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Brodley, Potential Competition Mergers].
7. See, e.g., FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967); and United States v.
Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964).
8. Potential competition, once the most promising of the conglomerate merger theories, has
been converted by recent Supreme Court decisions into a doctrine ofalmost metaphysical complexity.
Because of this conversion, the government, despite earlier successes, has been unable to prevail, at
either the preliminary or final relief stage. See BOC Int'l Ltd. v. FTC, 557 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1977); FTCv.
Atlantic Richfield Co., 549 F. 2d 289 (4th Cir. 1977); FTC v. Tenneco, Inc., 1977-1 Trade Cas. 61,449
(D.D.C. 1977); United States v. Hughes Tool Co., 416 F. Supp. 637 (C.D. Cal. 1976); United States v.
Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 1976-2 Trade Cas. 61,033 (D. Md. 1976); The Budd Co., 86 F.T.C. 518,
[1973-1976 Transfer Binder]TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 20,998 (1975); Beatrice Foods Co., 86 F.T.C. 1,
[1973-1976 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 20,994 (1975), affidsub nora. Beatrice Foods
Co. v. FTC, 540 F.2d 303 (7th Cir. 1976). In a final indignity to the doctrine, the Supreme Court has
twice expressed doubt concerning the legal existence of one of its two alternative formulations. United
Statesv. Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. 602,639 (1974); UnitedStatesv. FalstaffBreuing Corp,410
U.S. 526, 537 (1973). See generally Brodley, Potential Competition Mergers, supra note 6.
Reciprocity is a theory which is applicable only under limited circumstances-the merging firms
must be substantial buyers and sellers to the same firm or firms. Judicial decisions enjoining mergers on
grounds of reciprocity have been few, although a number of consent judgments have been entered.
Moreover, litigation success appears problematic in view of the requirement increasingly imposed by
the courts that the probability of post-merger reciprocity actually be proved. See United States v. ITT,
324 F. Supp. 19 (D. Conn. 1970), appeal disnissedperstipulation, 404 U.S. 80 1; United States v. ITT
1971 Trade Cas. 73,619 (D.II1. 1971); contra, U.S. v. White Consol. Indus. Inc., 323 F. Supp. 1397
1979]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 40:867
preliminary relief was almost invariably denied and thereupon mergers
were swiftly consummated.9 Final relief, if it came at all, was most likely
ineffective in restoring the acquired entity to independence.' 0 The courts,
by approving voluntary avoidance techniques, allowed last minute
maneuvers to be executed to quickly rid merging firms of antitrust-
offending portions of their business, effectively sanctioning a kind of
preemptive strike against the government's case." While some merger bids
have nevertheless been staved off by intense litigation effort, these results
owe more to delaying effect and introduction of extraneous issues than to
antitrust merit, for in almost none of the current wave of conglomerate
mergers could the plaintiffs, public or private, have prevailed under
current judicial interpretations had the antitrust issues been fully
litigated.' 2
Thus, the question that clearly presents itself is whether there shall be
a viable antitrust policy for conglomerate mergers relying in any part on
the political and social values encompassed in antitrust policy. The
issue is important generally in antitrust law, for the challenge is increas-
ingly made that there is no place in antitrust jurisprudence for political
and social values even when pursued without sacrifice of economic effi-
ciency. The historic merger wave now in progress, coupled with the
inability of the enforcement agencies to take effective legal action because
of the restrictive rulings of the courts, provides the occasion for Congress
(N.D. Ohio 1971). In fact, the reciprocity merger decisions are so weak that one expcrt practitioner has
suggested that this may be an area in which parties to a merger under certain conditions "will be
justified in taking substantial risks of noncompliance with the Department's mergerguidelines ... .
Johnson, Mergers and Acquisitions, in ANTITRUST ADVISOR 202 (C. Hills ed. 2d ed. 19,78).
The entrenchment effect theory and the closely related (if not identical) deep pocket theory have
no significant application to mergers between large firms. As one respectcd commentator put it, tile
entrenchment doctrine created "a modest legal principle" constraining "giant firms in a closely related
industry" from acquiring "a dominant and near monopolistic company in an industry populated by
relative pygmies." Davidow, Conglomerate Concentration and Section Seven: The Limitations ofthe
Anti-Merger Act, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1231, 1260 (1968). Similarly, the deep pocket doctrine involves
"entry of a giant into a market of pygmies," NBO Indus. Treadway Cos. v. Brunswick Corp., 523 F.2d
262,268 (3d. Cir. 1975), vacatedandremandedon othergroundssub. nom. Brunswick Corp.'v. Pueblo
Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977) or the "casting [of] a relative colossus . . . into the midst ofa
group of small competitors." United States v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 288 F. Supp. 543,545-46,
554 (N.D. I11. 1968). That is to say the target firm must be sufficiently small and the disparity in size
between it and the acquiring firm sufficiently great that the "giant amidst pygmies" analogy is apt. This
describes few if any of the large acquisitions that would be subject to the proposed legislation.
See generally, ATTY. GENERAL 1979 SMALL BUSINESS REPORT, supra note 5, at 16-18 (failures of
existing conglomerate merger enforcement theories).
9. See, e.g., FTC v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 549 F.2d 289 (4th Cir. 1977).
10. See Elzinga, The Anti-Merger Law: Pyrrhic Victories, 12J. L. & ECON. 43 (1969); Pfunder,
Plaine & Whittemore, Compliance with Divestiture Orders Under Section 7 oftthe Clayton Act: An
Analysis of the Relief Obtained, 17 ANTITRUST BULL. 19 (1972).
11. See, e.g., Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 584 F.2d 1195 (2d Cir. 1978);
and ATTY. GENERAL 1979 SMALL BUSINESS REPORT, supra note 5 at 18 (voluntary partial divestiture
leaving parties "free to combine the bulk of their assets"). See generally Brodley, Structural Remedies
in Merger Cases (statement before the National Commission for the Review of Antitrust Law and
Procedures, Oct. 26, 1978).
12. See ATTY. GENERAL 1979 SMALL BUSINESS REPORT, supra note 5; and Hearings on S. 600
Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 65 (1979) (statement of John H.
Shenefield) ("[T]he [g]ovemment has not won a litigated conglomerate case since 1974.") [hereinafter
cited as S. 600 Committee Hearings].
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to reaffirm the role of political and social values in merger law, or, if it
wishes, to accede to the virtual elimination of such values there and per-
haps elsewhere in antitrust.
II. INDISPENSABILITY OF POLITICAL
AND SOCIAL VALUES
The public benefit that the proposed merger legislation would most
vitally promote is the limitation of economic power and authority. No
antitrust value is at once so misunderstood and yet so indispensible. In
simplest terms, it reflects the continuing attempt by American
society to resolve the tension between the needs of modern technology
for large business units and our historic distrust of concentrated power.
The resolution achieved has been creative, fundamental, and durable,
hence its constitutional character.' 3 Growth of business firms to
impressive size has been permitted, but at the same time size is suspect
in the sense that its legitimacy is subject to question when carried
beyond the point of economic necessity. The continued questioning of
power, tempered by enforcement and judicial restraint, has not only
provided vital motivation for antitrust enforcement, but has helped to
maintain a broad base of public support for free competition itself. 4
The policy of limiting the concentration of private economic power is
nevertheless misunderstood as: (1) constituting a rejection of the economic
goal of allocative efficiency, (2) embracing protectionist policies that
subsidize favored private interests, and (3) reflecting adversely on the mor-
al posture and conduct of big business. In fact it is none of these things. The
Mr. Baker suggests that all this may somehow be about to change on the basis of the Government's
assertion in two recent large merger cases of a deep pocket theory which he suggests has "significant
potential." But in one of the cases, United States v. United Technologies Corp., 466 F. Supp. 196
(N.D.N.Y., 1978), the court rejected the theory outright, and in the other, United States v. Occidental
Petroleum Corp., Civ. Act. Nos. C-3-78-241124212681288 (S.D. Ohio, Oct. 13, 1978), there was no
decision at all since the acquisition was withdrawn. Conceding a lack of objectivity because he had an
involvement in the Occidental case, Mr. Baker nevertheless asserts that the Government had a "good
chance of scoring a broad conglomerate victory."
While this author suffers from a similar lack of objectivity, having also been involved in the case, it
is necessary to add that there is simply no precedent or basis in existing law for finding that an
acquisition of a firm having well over S1 billion in sales and assets and not the largest firm in its market
is subject to either the deep pocket or entrenchment doctrines. This is all the more true when the
acquiring firm is only about three times the size of the acquired firm, rather than being 100 or 1000 times
larger. See Ky P. Ewing, Jr., Where the Justice Department is Heading and Why (Remarks before
Business Week Conference on Acquisitions and Mergers, on June 22, 1979 at 14) [hereinafter cited as
Ewing]. Thus, nothing in the facts or theories of the Occidental case would lead to anyconfidence that
existing merger theories may yet prove effective in blocking a large, essentially conglomerate merger.
A large conglomerate merger may also involve relatively minor market overlaps or other
competitive relationships raising the "more conventional" horizontal and other competitive issues
which Mr. Baker pointed out were also present in the Occidental case. But these can usually be
effectively removed from the case by a voluntary divestiture ofall product lines about which allegations
of anticompetitive effects are made-which is exactly what was done in the Occidentalcase. See FTC v.
Atlantic Richfield Co., 549 F.2d 289 (4th Cir. 1977) (divestiture on eve of trial held curative), and
Ewing, supra, at 8 (voluntary divestiture as cure for horizontal and vertical anticompetitive effects).
13. See note 2 supra and authorities cited therein.
14. Non-economic goals for antitrust policy are objected to by some as social ideology, or in
more emotional terms as economic "populism." What this objection overlooks, however, is that an
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economic goal of allocative efficiency remains vital to antitrust policy and
indeed has provided a continuing constraint on the pursuit of political and
social values. 5 Protectionist legislation, which subsidizes a special group
at the expense of the whole, 16 does not represent an accommodation of
antitrust values, but rather the capture of the legislative process by special
interests.
The largest misunderstanding, however, is the notion that the pursuit
of political and social values in antitrust is an adverse judgment on the
morality of large business-the equating of bigness with badness (a
remonstrance typically followed by a demand that the imagined
indictment be proved). But the rationale of limiting the expansion of
centralized economic power is based not on punishing the misuse of social
power, but on preventing its accumulation. Thus, the issue in restricting
conglomerate mergers is not whether large or diversified firms are less (or
more) socially responsible than other firms, for the whole point of limiting
unnecessary size of firms is to avoid the necessity of monitoring their social
behavior-an exercise intrusive in itself.
All of this was well expressed with respect to single firm monopoly
power by Judge Wyzanski:
Concentrations of power, no matter how beneficently they appear to have
acted, nor what advantages they seem to possess, are inherently dangerous.
Their good behavior in the past may not be continued; and if their strength
were hereafter grasped by presumptuous hands, there would be no automatic
check and balance from equal forces in the industrial market. And in the
absence of this protective mechanism, the demand for public regulation,
public ownership, or other drastic measures would become irresistible in time
of crisis. Dispersal of private economic vower is thus one of the ways to
preserve the system of private enterprise. 7
The contemporary issue with respect to mergers now centers on
conglomerate growth. The accelerating pace of large mergers is primarily a
conglomerate merger movement. The pertinent question, therefore, is
whether conglomerate growth raises similar political and social issues. For
example, imagine that there were no limits on conglomerate mergers. This
economic ideology or system of belief is inescapable. As the economic historian, Douglas North,
reminds us, all societies invest substantial resources in an attempt to convince their constituents that
the existing economic system is legitimate; and specifically, in capitalist systems, that an unequal
distribution of resources is justified. See North, Structure and Performance: 71te Task of Economic
History, 16 J. EcoN. LIT. 963 (1978).
15. See Brodley, Potential Competition Mergers, supra note 6, at 33.40; and Ewing, supra note
12, at 2-3 (dual goal antitrust policy in which a primary concern for enhancing contumer welfare
operates as constraint on secondary goal of preventing "undue concentration of economic and political
power").
16. Examples of protectionist legislation include industry-protective regulation, various dealer
protection statutes, and much of the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13b, 21a (1976),
17. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 347 (1953), aff'dper curlain,
347 U.S. 521 (1954). See Pitofsky, The Political Content ofAntitrust, supra note 2, at 1054 ("[Cloncern
about economic power and the desire that it be dispersed complements the general American
governmental preference for a system of checks and balances and distribution of authority to prevent
abusive actions by the state.")
[Vol. 40:867
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would mean that in the absence of anticompetitive horizontal or vertical
overlaps, the antitrust laws would not bar a merger of General Motors with
IBM, or of Exxon with General Electric. Consider the implications of a
Supreme Court opinion declaring that mergers, however large, are
sanctioned under the antitrust laws in the absence of abuse or probable
anticompetitive effect. 8 Why is such a result intuitively offensive?
The reason is that such massive combinations would cause an
excessive concentration of what may be termed "discretionary economic
authority." Discretionary economic authority may be defined as a range of
business choice not dictated by or fully predictable from pure profit
maximizing behavior. It is "essentially power to make decisions that affect
the lives of other people."' 9 Discretionary authority so defined exists even
under the narrow assumption of short-run profit maximizing. Existence of
discretionary authority follows from the uncertainty in which all firms act,
and from the ability, particularly of large and diversified firms, to absorb
the results of suboptimal decisions without risk to enterprise survival.
Discretionary authority is reflected in that, viewed ex ante, a disinterested
observer in possession of all information known to management would be
unable to predict with certainty the decision the firm would make; and,
viewed expost, more than a single decision could have been made without
raising an imminent threat to the survival of the firm. To exercise such
choice is to possess a significant discretionary power that will have major
impact on people, communities, capital, and technology. It has long been a
premise of antitrust policy that such power should be reasonably diffused.
This was recognized in Alcoa20 despite its single firm monopoly context;
the legal offense in that case was essentially not abuse of power, but Alcoa's
ability to exercise discretionary decision-making authority over an entire
domestic industry.
So defined, a policy of limiting discretionary economic authority
supports an antitrust policy that puts an upper bound on the size to which
firms may grow by merger, both within an important market and in
absolute terms. The larger a firm becomes, the greater the zone of influence
of its decisions will be. Since to some considerable degree these decisions
permit discretionary or alternative choice, limitations on size promote
diversity and diffusion of economic decision-making.2'
This is all the more vital in view of First National Bank of Boston v.
Bellotti.22 In Bellotti, first amendment protections were given to the use of
18. In a merger of such magnitude there would no doubt be some horizontal market overlaps
and allegedly offensive vertical relationships created, but following recognized practice, these might be
cured by voluntary divestiture of offending product lines. See note 12 and authorities cited supra.
19. Dewey, The New Learning: One Man's View, in INDUSTRIAL. CONCENTRATION: THE NEW
LEARNING I 1 & n.18 (H. Goldschmid, H. Mann & J. Weston eds. 1974).
20. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416,424-27 2d Cir. 1945) (substantial
long term control over aluminum input production and marketing).
21. See Wildavsky, Book Review, 88 YALE L.J. 217, 134 (1978) (importance of preserving
diversity).
22. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
1979]
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corporate funds to advocate corporate views on an unrestricted range of
political as well as economic questions.
Imposing limits on the economic concentration achievable by merger
can be justified as providing support for the competitive system in still
another way. Mergers can cause sudden and upsetting changes for
employees, suppliers, communities and even whole geographic regions.
Thus, mergers accentuate a basic problem of capitalist societies-
maintaining public support for a sharply unequal and shifting distribution
of resources. Free competition is a rough-and-tumble affair that is
constantly creating economic losers as well as winners. These painful
shocks, amidst large resource inequality that makes economic reverses
only that much more stinging, are sustainable only within a system in
which participants believe in the basic fairness of the economic process.
Thus, the antitrust laws have always been concerned with the fairness of
competition, as well as its maintenance.
Most assuredly, there are losers from some large mergers: terminated
employees and managers, communities that lose plants, suppliers that are
discontinued, law firms and banks that lose clients, municipalities and
states that suffer tax losses. These sudden and often hurtful effects, while
never welcome, tend to become less acceptable as the decisionmaker grows
larger and more remote. At some point, the social consequences subject to
sudden single firm choice as a result of merger become so large that they
appear simply "unfair" and unacceptable-at which point pervasive
regulation is likely. Restrictive state takeover legislation is one example,
but far greater intrusions are possible. The very charters of corporations
might be made subject to periodic review and regulation. Corporate
governing boards might be required to become directly representative of,
or even elected by, the various constituencies affected by corporate
behavior: employees, consumers, suppliers, local communities, regions
and even the nation as a whole. Most significantly, corporate decisions
having "social impact" might become subject to governmental review.23
In short, antitrust policy, including a policy that would place limits on
growth through merger, can be seen as an alternative to other, possibly
more onerous forms of regulation. This, incidentally, may explain why the
same Judiciary Committee of the Senate could sponsor and promote both
deregulation of airlines and conglomerate merger legislation. In a most
general sense, the purpose of such legislation is to preclude future, more
pervasive regulation of corporations that have been allowed to merge to
unlimited size. 4
23. See Epstein, Societal, Managerial, and Legal Perspectives on Corporate Social
Responsibility-Product and Process, 30 HASTINGS L. J. 1287, 1311 (1979) (summarizing proposals
for modifying and restricting corporate governance).
24. None of this is to take away from the increasingly recognized importance of corporate social
responsibility. See generally Epstein, Societal, Managerial, and Legal Perspectives on Corporate
Social Responsibility-Product and Process, supra note 23. But it is relevant to determining whether
response to social demands will continue to be primarily exercises of individual discretion by the
managers of business firms (subject to the constraint of detailed but limited statutes e.g.,
[Vol. 40:867
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This is to establish only that non-economic values have a role to play
in conglomerate merger policy, not how far they should be pursued. And it
is not meant to imply that the efficiency consequences of that policy should
not be carefully assessed. To the latter concern we now turn.
III. ABSENCE OF UNDESIRABLE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES
Despite possible political and social gains, conglomerate merger
legislation would nonetheless be ill-advised if it undermined the efficiency
and competitive ability of American industry. Opponents of the legislation
urge that it would do just that by (1) removing takeover pressures on
managers who perform poorly, (2) preventing the transfer of unproduc-
tive assets to more efficient hands, (3) lowering the return to investment in
target firms,. (4) discouraging enterprise growth even by internal
expansion, and (5) hampering the ability of U.S. firms to compete in
world markets and discouraging foreign investment in the United States.
25
On its face this is a formidable challenge, but it does not withstand
close examination. To begin with, the very notion that important
efficiencies are produced from mergers between essentially unrelated
companies has something of a mystery about it. Favored acquisition
candidates in recent mergers have not been the lagging, floundering firms
most in need of better management, but more often highly successful firms
with strong market shares.26 Moreover, conglomerate firms have not
compiled records that are superior to those of nonconglomerates. 7 If the
key to conglomerate efficiency lies in the pressure that a takeover threat
imposes on existing managements, it is unclear why such pressure is not
equally necessary for the largest firms whose very size insulates them from
successful takeover.28 This point gains force when one realizes that this
largely insulated group of firms are the very firms upon whose competitive
ability our success in world markets is said to most vitally depend. In short,
environmental, civil rights) or whether individual discretion is to be subject to the general limitation of
a government supervisorial body with general authority over corporate decisions impacting the"public
interest or welfare." It appears delusional to think that the present degree of autonomy of private
decision can survive if business units grow without limit. See also Pitofsky, The Political Content of
Antitrust, supra note 2, at 1057-58 (direct government control the inevitable result of unlimited
corporate growth).
25. These arguments, ably summarized by Mr. Baker, formed the basis of the opposition to the
Senate bill presented by several economists and legal scholars who testified at the invitation ofvarious
business groups.See S. 600 Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 4.
26. See S. 600 Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 4, at 138 (statement of F. M. Scherer) and
economic authorities cited; and D. HAY & D. MORRIS, INDUSTRIAL ECONo.\tcs: THIEORY AND EvI-
DENCE 493-94 (1979) (foranygiven size category of firm, profitability is the best indicator of probability
of being taken over) [hereinafter cited as HAY & MORRIS, INDUSTRIAL Eco, o\1tCS.
This paper does not attempt to detail the numerous, not entirely consistent economic studies
bearing on the issues of the effects and motivations of conglomerate mergers. The evidence is reviewed
in P. STEINER, MERGERS: MoTivEs, EFFECTs, POLICIES (1975); Mueller, The Effects of Conglomerate
Mergers: A Survey of the Empirical Evidence, 1 J. BANK. & FIN. 315 (1977); and most recently in
HAY & MORRIS, INDUSTRIAL EcoNoMcS, supra.
27. See HAY & MORRIS, INDUSTRIAL EcoNoMIcs, supra note 26, at 485-86 (summarizing both
U.S. and British studies).
28. Id. at 494 (size of firm best deterrent to takeover).
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it remains a puzzle just how, for example, a major conglomerate
acquisition by one of the Big Three auto manufacturers will assist in
recapturing automobile sales lost to foreign producers. Indeed, it is even
possible that legislation restricting conglomerate acquisitions, far from
being economically hurtful, would have the effect of increasing investment
in new plant and equipment. We turn now to a particularized discussion of
these matters.
A. Efficiencies and the Acquisition Premium
Conglomerate legislation opponents argue thai, while we may not
know just how conglomerate firms achieve efficiencies from mergers, the
fact that they do achieve efficiencies is proved by the presence of the
acquisition premium itself. Indeed, the existence of this premium, which
historically has ranged from fifteen to twenty-five percent over market
value29 and presently is much higher,30 is the one solid economic fact
consistent with an efficiencies-promoting effect from conglomerate
mergers that emerged from the 1979 hearings on the Senate bill. The
efficiency inquiry, therefore, reduces in essence to what inferences are to be
drawn from the presence of the premium, and from the additional fact that
the premium is volatile. On the one hand, it is argued that the premium
reflects the efficiency or synergy gain to be achieved by the change in
ownership.31 On the other hand, it is difficult to explain under the
efficiencies-synergy theory why evidence is lacking that would point to
postmerger increases in earnings on acquired firms and assets.32 Moreover,
there are further difficulties with an efficiencies explanation for
conglomerate mergers. These difficulties include the preference of acquir-
ing firms for already successful firms as targets, the lack of interest in
29. See Halpern, Empirical Estimates of the Amount and Distribution of Gains to Companies in
Mergers, 46 J. Bus. 554 (1973), and S. 600 Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 4, at 557 (Pt. 1) (state-
ment of J. Fred Weston). Professor Weston appeared in opposition to S. 600.
30. In mid-1976, for example, a "starting premium" in a takeover battle was 20% to 40%. See
Troubh, Purchased Affection: A Primer on Cash Tender Offers, 54 HAn. BUs. RaV. 79, 84 (July-
August 1976).
31. That the acquiring firm itself earns no supra-normal return on its investment in the target
could be explained consistent with this theory as simply a reflection of competitiveness in the market
for corporate control. Thus the gap between original stock market value and the true value of the target
firm disappears as result of the competitive bidding between rival acquiling firms.
32. See Conn, Acquired Firm Performance After Conglomerate Merger, 43 S. ECON. J. 1170
(1976) (post-merger decline in profit/asset ratio of acquired firm); and STAFF REPORT TO THEI FTC,
ECONOMIC REPORT: CONGLOMERATE MERGER PERFORMANCE-AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS Ov NINE
CORPORATIONS, at 55-58 (1972) (post-merger profit/sales ratio of acquired entities declined at least as
often as it increased in study of nine conglomerate firms).
Data on earnings of an acquired entity after acquisition is not readily available since the acquired
firm is by that time a composite part of a larger firm. But in addition to the attempts to make selected
studies, cited above, indirect measures are also possible, e.g., in terms of specific managerial actions to
achieve synergies from the merger or general improvements in post-merger profitability of the whole
enterprise. These measures also fail to show that conglomerate mergers lead to substantial
improvements. See HAY & MORRIS, INDUSTRIAL ECoNoMICs, supra note 26, at 485-86 (little evidence of
post-merger managerial changes to capture efficiencies, or of real or pecuniary advantage from
conglomerate mergers).
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"turn-around" situations,33 and the sharp fluctuations that occur in pre-
miums, which can scarcely signify a sudden doubling or tripling in effi-
ciency of synergy gains from conglomerate mergers. Indeed, as a general
matter, efficiency and synergy gains from conglomerate mergers seem less
likely than from horizontal and vertical mergers. A far more plausible
explanation for the current premium is simply the historically low
valuation that the market currently places on company shares;34 it is the
same phenomenon that no doubt explains the recent upsurge in stock
repurchase programs.
Most assuredly, the premiums are beneficial to shareholders of target
firms, and it can be argued that the prospect of obtaining a future
premium, particularly at a time when stock market values lag, is a stimulus
to new investment. Under this analysis, prohibiting conglomerate mergers
would lower new investment incentives. But the point has less force as
applied to large conglomerate mergers, which typically involve long-
established, successful firms with large market shares, usually far removed
from original entrepreneurial investment s.3 The problem would be further
reduced by a merger policy that left large scope for acquisitions, while
foreclosing only a limited number of large mergers.
B. The Takeover Spur
There is less need for concern about loss of incentive from a lessening
of the takeover spur on laggard managers. The net gain from that stimulus
seems problematic even for firms not already too large to be immune from
such pressures, since the evidence fails to establish that takeovers operate
selectively on incompetent managers. 6 Moreover, even if takeovers did
operate in this way, the efficiency gain is doubtful since managers desiring
to avoid takeover may pursue non-productive (but more readily
attainable) legal and business stratagems rather than efficiency-enhancing
moves. 37 It seems pertinent to note that the achievements of American
33. See HAY & MORRIS, INDUSTRIAL EcoNoIics, supra note 26, at 495.
34. See S. 600 Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 4, at 136 (statement of F. M. Scherer) (stock
prices are depressed and in many cases it is cheaper to buy up whole firms in the stock market than to
build new capacity); see also Cole, Selling Healthy Companies, N.Y. Times, Oct. 21,1979, §3 (Business
& Finance), at I (attempt by shareholders to force liquidations of healthy firms whose assets areworth
more than their stock market value).
35. The defense that mergers are necessary to allow foundingentrepreneurs to cash out at capital
gains rates has still less force when one takes into account the existence of sophisticated tax planning
devices to achieve intergeneration transfer without substantial tax consequence. See Cooper, A
Voluntary Tax? New Perspectives on Sophisticated Estate Tax Avoidance, 77 CoLUM. L REy. 161
(1977) (taxes can be reduced to close to the vanishing point); and Feld, The Implications of Minority
Interest and Stock Restrictions in Valuing Closely-Held Shares, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 934 (1974).
Moreover, with limited exception, the Senate bill is concerned only with transfers of more than $100
million, a value beyond the expectations, if not hopes, of most new venture investors.
36. Indeed, a recent review of the economic evidence found a lack of support for the whole
theory that the forced merger "takes assets away from incompetent or wrongly motivated managers."
HAY & MORRIS, INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS, supra note 26, at 498 (reviewing American and British
evidence).
37. Among the pre-merger techniques to avoid takeover suggested in a recent report for
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industry and the creation of its large productive capacity were largely
effected without the stimulus of conglomerate takeovers, which are
relatively recent phenomena. In any event, a constrained merger rule that
would reduce the number of potential merger partners for only the largest
and frequently most successful firms would leave scope for whatever
positive stimulus takeover concern may exercise on managers.
On the postive side there would be a significant savings in transaction
costs from a more stringent policy toward large mergers. The massively
contested takeover can entail legal and financial fees running in millions
and sometimes tens of millions of dollars, make huge inroads on key
executive time, cause otherwise unnecessary defensive legal moves long
before an acquisition, encourage defensive acquisitions to absorb cash
reserves, create antitrust and other legal problems for the would-be
acquiring firm,3 9 and cause possible miscalculations and attendant costs
from hastily arranged "white knight" or friendly mergers to stave off the
tender offer. These costs are likely to be highest for large target firms
(investment banker fees, for example, often running as a percentage of the
purchase price), and thus deterrence of the largest mergers would achieve
the largest transaction cost savings.40
C. Altering the Incentives for Growth, Domestic or Foreign
The most serious question that must be answered with respect to the
legislation is whether it might significantly alter incentives for growth or
investment in domestic or foreign markets. Domestic investment
incentives would be affected adversely if firms approaching statutory size
limitations held off from making investment in new plant to preserve
merger capacity. Foreign investment incentives would be altered if U.S.
firms restricted from domestic acquisition shifted investment to foreign
acquisitions, or if foreign firms either directed investment away from
specialists were the following strategic moves (none of them production-enhancing): (1) increase the
percentage of shares owned by friendly interests; (2) publicize insider ownership; (3) amend bylawsto
require high votes for mergers to permit "a small minority . . . to hold off any potential takeover;"
(4) issue specialized classes ofstock; (5) issue additional debt; (6) change financial practices to make a
profitable corporation appear less profitable; (7) stagger election of directors; (8) prevent removal of
directors without cause; (9) eliminate cumulative voting; (10) prevent calling of special meetings;
(11) make restrictive contracts with lenders to provide for acceleration of loans if control changes,
(12) seek state legislation to hinder takeover; and (13) develop a comprehensive defensive battle plan
to be available for immediate implementation as soon as a tender is announced. Austin & Segel, Private
Antitrust Litigation in Tender Offer Takeovers . . . And Other Tender Offer Defense Tactics, 13
MERGERS AND AcQUISITIONs 4, 7-9 (Summer, 1978). Another defensive tactic is an annual retainer ofa
premier legal specialist. See Forbes Magazine, Dec. 11, 1978, at 49 (over 100 corporations have the
same attorney, a leading merger specialist, on annual retainers as high as $40,000).
38. See S. 600 Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 4, at 136 (statement of F, M. Scherer),
39. One study found the transaction costs per share to amount to 140o of the market value of the
shares in successful tender offers. R. Smiley, The Economics of Tender Offers 124-125 (1973)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University) cited in Clark, The Regulation of Financial
Holding Companies, 92 HARV. L. REV. 787, 820 n.145 (1979).
40. It is necessary to offset this transactional gain from the new legislation, however, against the
costs of administering the legislation itself. Clearly any new standard or procedure will entail costs, but
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the United States to overseas markets, or alternatively, increased merger
investments in the United States, thus taking advantage of the reduced
number of large U.S. firms eligible to make acquisitions.
With respect to domestic investment, any size limitation on merger
growth unavoidably creates incentive to avoid the limitation; this includes
limiting internal growth that would foreclose a desired acquisition. It is
precisely for this reason that the proposed statute contains a spin-off or
voluntary divestiture provision that would permit a firm to make an
acquisition above statutory limits if it divests itself of comparable assets.
41
Thus, under the spin-off provision, a firm nearing the statutory limit on
size could make as large an investment in internal expansion as it wished
withoutjeopardy to future merger options so long as it was willing to divest
itself of assets comparable to those that it might later acquire by merger.
Alternatively, if a firm nearing statutory limits were unwilling (or unable)
to undertake divestiture, it could proceed with the acquisition and there-
after invest in internal expansion since the statute, of course, places no
limitation on internal investment.
Foreign acquisitions raise problems for any effective merger policy,
whether horizontal, vertical or conglomerate. That these problems have
not become acute under existing law is simply another indication of the
feebleness of present enforcement. But merger policy would be invigorated
under the Senate bill, or alternative proposal, and thus the foreign
investment impact must be faced. The essential problem is that if cross-
national acquisitions are exempted, a large shift of investment resources
into foreign acquisitions by U.S. firms and domestic acquisitions by
foreign firms could occur; and if cross-national acquisitions are includedin
the statute, issues arise concerning foreign relations, jurisdiction, comity
and international trade.42
Proponents of conglomerate merger legislation have sought to resolve
these problems of foreign acquisitions in different ways. With respect to
these can be held down if the number of included firms and transactions is limited, and if the issues to be
resolved are specified as far as possible in objective terms, e.g., sales and assets. While objective
measures such as sales and assets can pose their own difficulties, the complexities are less than those
involved in the current vaguely specified substantive concepts pertaining to conglomerate mergers. See
Brodley, Potential Competition Mergers, supra note 6, at 19-25.
41. For more detailed discussion of the spin-off alternative, see notes 65-72 and accompanying
text infra.
42. It has also been argued that ifU.S. firms are restricted in merger growth they will be unable to
undertake the large risks entailed in foreign operations. Assuming the merger law is cast in the more
constrained version urged below, this seems unlikely because growth up to S2 billion by mergerwould
still be permitted. In any event, the dampening of risk dependt most directly on diversification of
investment, and diversification is achieved by combining within a single portfolio risks that are
independent, even when each individual investment in the portfolio is highly risky. Thus, individual
risks in foreign investment can be balanced to make the firm as a whole less risky than its parts. Further,
only investments leading to controlling interests violate the statute and diversifying investments can of
course be carried out without acquiring control. Finally, alternative methods of diversification are
available that may give firms more investment latitude under the statute, includingconsortia and joint
ventures that allow the risk of particular operations to be shared without full merger of the
participating firms.
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overseas acquisitions by U.S. firms, both the FTC and the Antitrust
Division would simply apply the same standards applicable to purely
domestic acquisitions.43 When the situation is reversed, that is, when a
foreign firm makes a U.S. acquisition, the FTC would impose a limitation
on the size of the foreign firm's holdings within the United States,44 and the
Antitrust Division would impose a limitation on the foreign firm's total
size.45 Both proposals would largely exempt foreign acquisitions by
foreign firms." The Senate bill contains no provisions dealing specifically
with cross-national mergers, and thus in its present form it would apply
equally to domestic and foreign acquisitions (subject to jurisdictional
limits).
The variations and complexities of the proposals concerning foreign
acquisitions result from attempts to serve too many, policies at once-
antitrust, foreign trade, and balance of payments, as well as concerns
relating to excessive foreign ownership of U.S. industry. To clarify the
policy choice it is helpful to keep the objective of the legislation in sharp
focus. Most simply put, the legislation seeks to limit mergers that
concentrate industrial authority and power within the United States. To
this end the Senate bill defines excessive concentration in terms of gross
size, but supplements this in the case of leading firm acquisitions by a
second measure based on market size. Restrictions on acquisitions within
the United States clearly and directly serve this statutory purpose.
Restrictions on acquisitions outside the U.S. at best indirectly promote
this purpose, either by preventing distortion of investment decisions or
because worldwide size is also related to domestic industrial power.47 But
inclusion of foreign acquisitions causes severe complications.
An evenhanded application of the statute to all firms, based so far as
possible solely on their holdings within the United States, seems a
preferable approach. It would not attempt to resolve problems of the
43. Thus, acquisition limits would apply to U.S. firms without regard to where the assets were
located. See S. 600 Committee Hearings, supra note 12, at 2 4 6 (statement of Alfred F. Dougherty, Jr.);
and Ewing, supra note 12, at 22-23. (It should be noted that the Antitrust Division's position on foreign
acquisitions has evolved since the Spring, 1979 Senate Hearings. The Ewing speech (Id. at 21-22)
appears to be the most recent published statement.).
44. Size limitations on U.S. holdings by a foreign firm would be less than those applicable to
domestic firms. Thus, while a domestic firm might have up to $2 billion of FrC-defined assets and sales
(assuming the firm had no foreign holdings), the U.S. holdings of a foreign firm (including its imports
into the U.S.) would be limited to half that amount-SI billion. On the other hand, the overseas
holdings of the foreign firm would be unrestricted. S. 600 Committee Hearings, supra note 12, at 235
and 246 (statement of Alfred F. Dougherty, Jr.).
45. This would be the same $2 billion limitation applicable to domestic firms. See Ewing, supra
note 12, at 22-23.
46. The FTC proposal would exempt such acquisitions altogether. See S. 600 Committee
Hearings, supra note 12, at 246 (statement of Alfred F. Dougherty, Jr.). The Antitrust Division would
include foreign acquisitions by foreign firms only when there were related U.S. holdings by both of the
merging firms that caused the post-merger company to have U.S. sales or ssets exceeding $2 billion,
See Ewing, supra note 12, at 23.
47. See S. 600 Committee Hearings, supra note 12, at 246 (statement ofAlfred F. Dougherty,
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balance of payments or "excessive" investment either into or out of the
country. It would leave such issues to be addressed by more comprehensive
approaches, legislative or executive, that could consider all foreign
investment incentives, including, for example, strong tax incentives
favoring some types of foreign investments.48 At the same time domestic
industry and markets would be protected from unrestricted concentration
through mergers, by firms domestic or foreign.
More specifically, under this approach the statute would restrict
mergers based on (1) gross size of holdings within the United States and
(2) market share of the target firm within the United States when the
acquiring firm has large assets or sales. Only in the latter instance would
the size of the acquiring firm outside the United States be relevant, for the
market share provision would be applicable to leading firm acquisitions by
firms over $2 billion wherever their assets might be located. There would
be no restriction on foreign acquisitions by either U.S. or foreign firms,
except as might be imposed by foreign jurisdictions themselves. Thus,
neither U.S. nor foreign firms would be disadvantaged in ability to grow in
foreign markets, and both would be subject to limits on growth through
merger within the United States.49
Such a provision would offer significant protection against what
appears to be the limited antitrust concern based on the foreign nationality
of the acquiring firm-the possibility that foreign firms would come to
dominate important U.S. markets. Under these provisions, however, not
only would no foreign firm be able to acquire more than $2 billion in U.S.
sales or assets, but also no foreign firm having $2 billion or more of sales or
assets, wherever located, would be able to acquire a leading firm in a
substantial market. Thus, large foreign firms would not be able to acquire
dominant U.S. firms or market leaders. Their merger efforts would instead
have to be deflected to target firms with smaller market shares, and in that
event the large size of the acquiring firm could well be an advantage,
48. See A. FELD, REPORT TO FTC BuREAu OF COMPETITION: TAx POLICY AND CObsP.EnTIoN 43-
44, reprinted in A Review of Selected Tax Expenditures: Investment Tax Credit: Hearings Before the
Subcommittee on Oversight of the House Committee on Ways and Afeans, 96th Cong.. 1st Sess. 309,
325 (1979) (tax advantages often present in overseas operations).
49. Exempting foreign acquisitions by U.S. firms raises the problem of deflecting acquisition
dollars overseas, thereby harming the balance of payments, and possibly reducing productive
investment in the United States if acquisition is followed by additional resource commitments by the
parent firm. While excessive outflow of funds into foreign acquisitions could conceivably be a problem,
it does not seem one that should be addressed by an antitrust statute. As suggested in the text, such a
problem seems properly the concern of a comprehensive policy that would include all foreign
investment incentives. It seems relevant to add that the long run effects of foreign investment on
balance of payments are by no means certain since those investments produce future flow of earnings
into the country. Moreover, foreign acquisitions will tend to rise when the dollar is strong and the
balance of payments is relatively healthy and fall when the dollar is weak. In periods ofweak currency
and low acquisition the flow of income into the country from previous investments will continue when
such foreign inflow is most needed. Thus, there seems to be no reason to interfere with managerial
decision concerning the relative advantage of foreign acquisition as compared with domestic
investment except as it might be necessary during certain periods to put a general limitation on the
outflow of funds.
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serving to intensify competition. Under the present version of the Senate
bill, acquisitions would be covered in markets having annual sales of $100
million or more, but this is overly restrictive and at the very least should be
doubled to $200 million.5
D. The Special Problem of the Failing or Near-Failing Firm
Acquisition of a failing or faltering firm, followed by fresh infusion of
investment funds, can be socially beneficial. 51 This benefit could conceiv-
ably be lost if the acquisition is precluded as a result of conglomerate
merger restrictions. The proposed legislation goes some distance in meet-
ing this problem by way of its spin-off provision that would allow an other-
wise prohibited acquisition if comparable assets are divested. Some cases
remain, however, in which the target firm will be too large to make a spin-
off of comparable assets feasible. In those instances, the Senate bill would
permit acquisition on a finding of enhancement of competition or creation
of substantial efficiencies. But these complex concepts introduce serious
problems of their own. It would be preferable simply to permit a merger of
one or more failing or near-failing companies upon a finding that: (1) the
target firm is a failing or near-failing firm, (2) no smaller firm is a
reasonably likely purchaser, and (3) spin-off of comparable assets is not
feasible.
E. The Possibility that the Legislation Would Increase
Productive Economic Investment
Far from diminishing productive investment, there is some reason to
think that conglomerate merger legislation would increase the flow of
investment funds into new plant and equipment. It has been suggested (but
not proved) that the current large investments in acquisitions are
displacing, to some extent, investment in new plant and equipment 5 To
be sure, no funds are lost when capital is retired through an acquisition.
The recipient target firm shareholders could reinvest all they receive in
venture capital assets (as distinct from gold or "collectibles"). But some
responsible financial observers are fearful that the net consequence is
negative because takeovers may indeed by a substitute for capital
spending.53 One thoughtful investment banker has recently suggested that
50. See notes 73 to 80 and accompanying text infra.
51. The benefit is in terms of impact on affected communities and employees, and not primarily
in terms of allocational or economic efficiency. The latter is not necessarily injured by failure of an
individual firm. See R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOOMIC PERSPECrvE 21-22 (1976).
52. See S. 600 Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 4, at 136 (statement of F. M. Scherer)
(substitution of mergers for plant expansion probably more than trivial, but extent unknown).
53. BUSINESS WEEK, Nov. 14, 1977, at 177 (statement of Arthur Burns). See also Liman, Has the
Tender Movement Gone Too Far, 23 N.Y.L.S.L. REV. 687,708 (1978) (takeovers may have distorted
capital formation process and unduly diverted investment banking resources); and S. 600
Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 4, at 461-62 (Pt. I) (statement of Michael Gort, The Role of Con-
glomerate Mergers in the American Economy) (investment in a firm's existing industry is a likely
alternative use of funds now used for conglomerate acquisitions, but in Goit's view a less desirable one
because of its lower return). Professor Gort appeared in opposition to S. 600.
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capital spending by target firms makes them more vulnerable to takeover
because of the inevitable lag created between such expenditures and
subsequent increases in profitability and market value of shares.4 If so,
this would be a strikingly perverse economic effect.
IV. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO LIMITING CONGLOMERATE MERGERS
Thus far, this article has argued that, at least to some degree, a more
stringent rule for conglomerate mergers is desirable, and that it could be
achieved without substantial efficiency cost. There remains the question of
what is the appropriate scope and content of the legislation. To a large
extent the considerations previously discussed will determine the approach
to this question. Several policy alternatives are available and require con-
sideration before making specific recommendations.
A. Policy Options
1. The Status Quo
Legal theories of competitive injury resulting from conglomerate
mergers lack viability.55 This does not, however, mean that the status quo
prevents effective resistance to conglomerate acquisitions. On the con-
trary, current legal practice permits heavy private opposition to merger
tender offers, sometimes accompanied by government intervention. 6 Doc-
trinal looseness and liberal pleading rules make it easy to state a cause of
action on weak and speculative theories, and to plunge the parties into ex-
pensive litigation, however remote the chances of ultimate success. The
result is the prevention, through delay and pyramiding costs of some frac-
tion of the mergers that other approaches might also bar. This policy leads
to sporadic and uncertain results and high transaction costs.
57
2. Absolute Prohibition of Certain Mergers
The Senate bill contains an absolute prohibition of mergers among
the approximately 250 large corporations having sales or assets exceeding
$2 billion.58 The prohibition is highly administrable, but risks loss of
efficiencies in those (perhaps rare) instances when the efficiencies might be
substantial. An absolute prohibition also removes from risk of takeover
the relatively smaller firms within the group of 250 for which tender offer
54. Troubh, Takeover Strategy: The Investment Banker's Role: Characteristics of Target
Companies, 32 Bus. L. 1301, 1302-3 (1977).
55. See note 8 supra.
56. See, e.g., United States v. United Technologies Corp., 466 F.Supp. 196 (N.D.N.Y. 1978);
United States v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., Civ. Act. Nos. C-3-78-241124212681288 (S.D. Ohio
Oct. 13, 1978).
57. This might be acceptable if there were some direct relationship between success in resisting a
tender offer and efficiency of management, but no such showing has been made, or, within the
knowledge of this writer, claimed.
58. See S. 600 Committee Hearings, supra note 12, at 250-53 (statement of Alfred F.
Dougherty, Jr.) (237 corporations shown as having sales or assets exceeding S2 billion in 1977).
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remains a feasible alternative, and thus arguably lessens pressures on
incompetent managers. 9 In addition, the legislation would apparently
block merger even in those instances when one of the firms was faltering, or
failing. Finally, accepting the presence of social-political reasons to limit
firm size, the benefits are not spread equally across the 250-firm group, but
in principle would diminish as firm size decreases. These considerations
militate in favor of narrowing if not eliminating the group of absolutely-
prohibited mergers.
3. Prohibition Subject to Affirmative Defenses
A merger law that attempts to achieve social benefits without effi-
ciency loss would seek to bar only those mergers that would not enhance
competition or achieve efficiencies. Thus, the presence of either of these
conditions should, logically, constitute an affirmative defense. The diffi-
culty is that the legal issues presented, relating to assessment of future
economic behavior and performance, are in most instances intractable,
60
The problems in utilizing an efficiencies-type defense in a merger statute
are greater than under a monopoly statute.61 Difficult as the issde is under
a monopoly statute,62 at least the demonstration relies on past facts, while
in a merger case the increased efficiencies or enhanced competitiveness is
entirely prospective. Thus, the uncertainties in litigating these issues
would be enormous. Indeed, it is likely that defendants would rarely be
able to sustain their burden of proof in the face of determined government
opposition. 6' Hence, inclusion of these defenses in the bill may, realisti-
cally viewed, simply create an administrative discretion in the enforcement
agencies to approve a merger, notwithstanding violation of statutory
standards. It is doubtful, however, that the antitrust enforcement per-
sonnel, any more than courts of law, are qualified to resolve an issue of
such technical complexity and uncertainty. Thus, these affirmative de-
fenses should not be allowed. 4 The problem they attempt to meet must be
dealt with in another way.
59. But see notes 36-38 and related text supra (questioning whether takcover pressures produce
net benefits in managerial performance).
60. The enhancement of competition standard opens the proceedinlgs to issues of "enhanced
market efficiency, lowering of prices, raising of quality, and innovation in products and production
techniques . . . ." Statement of the Department of Justice in Support of the Administration's
Proposed Petroleum Company Merger Legislation, at 12 (enclosure with letter of John H. Shenefield
to Senator Kennedy, July 31, 1979) (the proposed Petroleum Company Merger Legislation contains an
enhancement of competition defense essentially similar to that included in S. 600).
61. See 1 NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF ANTITRUST LAWS AND PROCEDUItus,
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 158-59 (1979) (describing no-fault monopoly
proposal with efficiencies defense).
62. See Brodley, Industrial Concentration and Legal Feasibility: The Efficiencles Defense, 9 J.
ECON. ISSUES (1975) (probing issues in monopoly setting).
63. See Brodley, Potential Competition Mergers, supra note 6, at 19-25 (consistent inability of
litigants to sustain burden of proof on performance issues in potential competition cases), In light of
experience under the potential competition doctrine, it is scarcely reassuring that the Antitrust
Division asserts that the enhancement of competition defense presents similar difficulties, See Ewing,
supra note 12, at 27.
64. But see note 84 and related text infra (discussion of failing firm defense).
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4. Spin-off of Equivalent Assets
Permitting an acquisition on the condition that the acquiring firm
spin off or divest itself of an equivalent amount of assets in the form of one
or more viable business units provides a self-administered approach to the
efficiency problem. Presumably, mergers will then be undertaken when the
expected return on the new assets exceeds the return on the assets to be
divested; the higher the differential in return, the greater the incentive to
use the spin-off option. While this will not always work out neatly since
divestible assets may not be available to a particular firm, the merger-
induced efficiency will still be obtainable, if there is a comparable acquiring
firm, either smaller in size or better positioned to make divestiture.
The most important disadvantage of the spin-off approach lies in the
additional administrative procedures that would be necessary to ensure
compliance. It is urged that these would entail high transaction costs and
would be counterproductive in terms of economic and social benefits.
Opponents stress that difficult valuation problems would be introduced in
measuring assets and sales; purchasers for spun-off units may be hard to
find; and the spun-6ff entities, presumptively the firm's least productive
holdings, may turn out to be nonviable.
The spin-off approach is worked out in some detail in the FTC
testimony.65 Under the FTC approach, valuation problems concerning
spun-off units are minimized by using the market value of assets as the
benchmark whenever possible. Thus, if assets or shares are sold in an
arm's length transaction, the value of the divested assets would simply be
the sale price (or the public offering price if the disposition is by an under-
writing). Similarly, in an acquisition, the value of the acquired firm would
be the acquisition price. It is only necessary then to compare these values
to ascertain whether the divestiture is sufficient. 66 Valuation is more diffi-
cult in the absence of an arm's length sale: for example, if the shares of
the divested firm are simply distributed to stockholders of the divesting
firm. But appraisal of assets is not an unknown science; and risks of
burdensome litigation on valuation issues can be minimized by using a
binding appraisal procedure in cases in which there is no market'sale.
67
Purchasers of divested assets in past merger proceedings have
frequently been hard to find.68 There were, however, difficulties in the prior
proceedings that would not be present here. Acquiring firms subject to a
merger divestiture order did not have the incentive in those proceedings to
maximize the return from the divestiture sale in itself, but rather to
65. S. 600 Committee Hearings, supra note 12, at 232-37 (statement of Alfred F. Dougherty, Jr.).
66. Id. at 233, 235. The divested assets need not always equal the acquired assets. When the
acquiring firm is below statutory size, divestiture is necessary only as to the excess above statutorysize
resulting from the acquisition.
67. For example, the government and the parties might be required to accept as conclusive the
valuation placed on the divested assets by one or more appraisers upon whose appointment they mu-
tually agreed. In addition, an advance permissive ruling, analogous to a tax ruling, might be utilized.
68. See authorities cited in note 10 supra.
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maximize a joint return from the divestiture sale plus the return on
whatever portion of the acquired assets the acquiring firm might manage to
retain. Moreover, there was no time limit on the divestiture. In fact, if the
proceedings dragged on long enough, the acquiring firm was sometimes
excused altogether from divesting.69 Entities to be divested thus might
consist of unattractive or overpriced assets. By contrast, in divestiture
pursuant to the spin-off provision of the proposed conglomerate merger
legislation there is an incentive to make the divested entity sufficiently
attractive and valuable to bring a price within a relatively short period that
will be as high as possible and at least comparable to that of the newly-
acquired entity.7"
Spun-off entities may not always prove viable, and in those instances
the remedy would not achieve its full purpose. But such cases would be
essentially accidental and unforseeable; for if nonviability were obvious, it
would severely reduce the value that could be obtained in a market sale (or
other disposition). In that event, it would be futile to undertake divestiture
since the disposition value on the spin-off would not be sufficient to
support a substantial acquisition. Thus, the statute contains no incentive
to spin off nonviable entities; but rather, promotes divestiture of assets that
will yield sufficient market returns to support desired acquisitions.7
The spin-off provision attempts to achieve the statutory objectives
with minimum regulatory intervention. It leaves to private decision-
makers the determination whether the return from new acquisition justifies
divesting existing assets, what assets should be divested, and what is the
most economic means of doing so. In making all of these decisions the
firm's private interest in minimizing costs and maximizing gain will largely
accord with the social interest inherent in the legislation and be further
implemented by carrying out its mandate in the least costly way. 72
5. Leading Firm Acquisitions
The Senate bill would prohibit certain large firms from acquiring
another firm that has twenty percent or more of a $100 million market.
69. See Pfunder, Plaine & Whittemore, Compliance with Divestiture Orders Under Section 7 of
the Clayton Act: An Analysis of the Relief Obtained, supra note 10, at 105-06.
70. Another factor favoring divestiture by spin-off under the proposed merger statute is the
greater availability of spin-off, in its technical meaning of a distribution of the shares of the divested
entity among the shareholders of the divesting firm. In merger divestitures this was frequently ruled out
because of unfavorable tax consequences when, as would be typically the case, the firm to be spun off
had been acquired within the past 5 years. See I.R.C. §355 (five year holding period for favorable tax
consequences). Under the proposed merger statute this method of divestiture would be made more
available since the acquired firm itself is to be retained, and the older assets to be spun off would
frequently have been held for more than the required five years.
71. It might also be desirable to amend the tax code, to allow tax free spin-offs pursuant to
antitrust statutes, and decrees, to permit tax favorable disposal of firms nos acquired more than 5 years
previously. See Brodley, Structural Remedies in Merger Cases, supra note 11 (proposal made as to
merger remedies under § 7 of Clayton Act).
72. In addition, spin-offserves to plade assets in the hands of the firm that anticipates the largest
prospect of an increased return.
[Vol. 40:867
S. 600
This provision is aimed at leading firm acquisitions in concentrated
markets.73 It is unlike the other portions of the Senate bill because its
rationale is in part purely competitive, and because it equates social power
with high market share rather than gross size of sales or assets. In this
respect it is closer to existing merger law, which combines, in market share
tests, considerations of both market and social power;74 and it is similar
to proposals that have been made in the past by scholars" and by a
Presidential study group.76 Inclusion of a leading firm provision in the
proposed statute appears particularly desirable in view of the foreign
acquisitions problem, but the provision now included in the Senate bill is
overexpansive.
Prevention of leading firm acquisitions in concentrated markets
would arguably promote competition by avoiding some of the losses of
potential competition and by preventing entrenchment of dominant firms.
Assuredly, a leading firm provision is a very blunt instrument and could
not be justified on competition reasons alone.78 The main rationale of a
leading firm rule is that it provides a separate measure of discretionary
power, which, when properly restriced, supplements the primary measure
based on size of assets and sales. As already pointed out, market
dominating and leading firms have more discretionary economic authority
than lesser firms.79 It would follow, then, that firms already among the
largest in assets and sales augment their discretionary power and authority
when they acquire dominant or leading firms in significant and highly
concentrated markets.
A leading firm restriction is particularly useful in meeting the problem
of U.S. acquisitions by foreign firms. American antitrust law cannot
73. See S. 600 Committee Hearing, supra note 12, at 70 (statement ofJohn H. Shenefield). The
FTC proposal contains no restriction on leading firm acquisitions.
74. See, e.g., United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 331, 364-65 (1962); see
generally, Brodley, Potential Competition Mergers, supra note 6, at 38.
75. See Campbell & Shepherd, Leading-Firm Conglomerate Mergers, 13 A.NrITRUsT BULL.
1361 (1968).
76. WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE, REPORT OF THE WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE ON ANTITRUST
POLICY, reprinted in 2 ANTITRUST L. & EcoN. REV. at 11, 30 (Winter 196869).
77. See notes 19-22 and accompanying text supra.
78. Nevertheless, moderate competitive benefits would be achieved because the provision would
prevent some mergers that might reduce potential competition orentrench dominant firms. Large firms
are the most likely potential entrants (see Brodley, Potential Competition Mfergers, supra note 6, at 75-
76: new market entrants were predominantly among 200 largest industrial firms). Thus a rule
forbidding leading firm acquisitions by large firms would include some significant potential entrants.
Entrenchment effect is likely only when a very large outside firm acquires a dominant firm in a
much smaller market resulting in the further solidification of the acquired firm's dominance. The
entrenchment effect may be a rare occurrence since it rests more on psychological inhibition by
remaining small firms than on economic constraint. See, e.g., FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S.
568, 570-75 (1967); United States v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 288 F. Supp. 543, 544-56 (N.D.Il.
1968). However rare the phenomenon, the proposed leading firm provision will catch all entrenchment
cases in the markets covered by the rule. This follows from the legal definition of entrenchment effect
which has been confined to acquisitions by firms of largest magnitude. See Brodley, Potential
Competition Mergers, supra note 6, at 82. Thus, marginal competitive gains appear to be the likely
product of a leading firm merger rule.
79. See Brodley, Potential Competition Mergers, supra note 6, at 33-40.
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appropriately regulate the growth of foreign firms through overseas
mergers. But policy abstention as to overseas mergers leads to the risk of
unduly advantaging foreign firms in the bidding for U.S.-based com-
panies. This arises because, when merger limitations are based solely on
domestic size, a large U.S. firm would likely already be subject to merger
constraint, while the large foreign firm with small U.S. holdings would be
unconstrained until it reached the required level of U.S. holdings. Up to
that point the foreign firm might systematically acquire the leading firms
in a wide number of markets while large U.S. firms seeking such acquisi-
tions would be subject to the spin-off requirement. A restriction on U.S.
leading firm acquisitions by companies having more than $2 billion in
assets or sales (wherever located) would deflect U.S. acquisition efforts
by large foreign firms from leading to nonleading firms.80 Foreign firms
without other substantial U.S. holdings might continue to have some
advantage, however, with respect to acquisitions of non-leading firms,
since the foreign firms would not face spin-off requirements (until their
U.S. holdings reached $2 billion). On the other hand, U.S. firms would
find it easier to carry out a spin-off of presumably smaller nonleading
firms. More importantly, whatever advantage foreign firms might con-
tinue to enjoy concerning acquisitions of nonleading firms, would not
appear to be socially objectionable, since the purpose of the legislation is
not to prevent foreign acquisitions in the United States, but to deflect
them (along with acquisitions by large U.S. firms) into less power-
enhancing channels.
Risk of efficiency loss from restricting leading firm acquisitions ap-
pears small if markets are correctly defined. A firm with twenty percent or
more of a significant market is apt to be the largest or second largest mar-
ket participant, and thus probably a successful firm, with less to be gained
from new management than firms less successful in the sales competition.
There are disadvantages, nevertheless, in extending the legislation to
leading firm acquisitions. By introducing the concept of market share the
bill necessarily requires that markets be identified and defined. Since this is
at best an uncertain exercise, applicability of the provision becomes
unclear, impeding business planning and introducing difficult and
expensive litigation issues. Moreover, depending on how narrowly
markets are defined, the Senate bill might sweep in numerous, relatively
small acquisitions; for it would apply to acquisitions in markets having
annual sales of as little as $100 million (and to individual acquisitions of as
little as twenty percent of the market, or $20 million) by acquiring firms
having sales or assets exceeding $350 million. Bearing in mind the social
rationale of the bill and the difficulty of defining markets, the acquiring
. 80. Indeed, the leading firm restriction would bear more heavily on large foreign firms than
domestic firms since a foreign firm without other substantial U.S. holdings would not be in position to
divest itself of comparable assets, assuming (as seems appropriate) that the divestiture must be made
with respect to U.S. assets.
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firms should be of the same size as other covered acquisitions (that is, $2
billion) and covered target firms should be in much larger markets, for
example markets having sales of at least $200 million. This would
significantly limit the scope of the bill, in effect limiting it to acquisitions
above $40 million (or twenty percent of a $200 million market) by the 250
largest firms.
6. Temporary Moratorium
Opponents of conglomerate merger legislation urged repeatedly in the
1979 Senate hearings that legislation was unjustified in view of the lack of
knowledge about the social, political and other effects of large
conglomerate mergers. More study is their prescription, but meanwhile the
accelerated level of mergers continues. Accepting these premises, an
appropriate policy would be to impose a moratorium on large mergers,
during which time the requested studies could be undertaken. It would be
possible, moreover, to combine a moratorium with a spin-off approach, so
that larger mergers even during the moratorium period would be permitted
when there was divestiture of equivalent assets. This would help in assuring
that mergers producing exceptional efficiencies were not deferred. An
additional advantage of a moratorium is that since merger waves have run
in cycles, the current cycle might be over before the moratorium ended,
and then consideration of a permanent rule could take place in a calmer
merger period.
The disadvantage of a moratorium is that it might be extended
without the same consideration that accompanies an original proposal. In
addition, efficiencies deferred are, for the period of deferral, efficiencies
lost. This suggests that the scope of any moratorium be not significantly
larger than the class of mergers that can be barred with low risk of
efficiency loss. Finally, the use of a spin-off provision in conjunction with a
limited term moratorium creates added opportunities for avoidance
behavior with respect to divestiture requirements, defeating the statutory
objective. For example, firms merging within less than one year of the end
of the moratorium period could seek to defer divestiture until after the
anticipated expiration of the legislation if that relieved them of their duty
to divest. That in turn would create incentives to delay acquisitions to the
second of the two moratorium years. The best way of handlifig this
possible difficulty would be to require divestiture of covered acquisitions
taking place within the moratorium period even though the divestiture
itself was only accomplished afterwards.81
81. This is not a perfect solution, however, since firms might anticipate that if Congress chose to
allow the moratorium to expire, thus in effect rejecting the notion that large conglomerate mergers are
a continuing social problem, it might also be willing to relieve firms under divestiture obligations. In
addition, a moratorium might simply lead to deferral of large mergers until after the moratorium
expired, with little permanent effect. These problems would of course not exist if it became clear that
permanent legislation would be adopted following the moratorium.
1979]
OHIO STATE LA W JOURNAL
B. Policy Recommendations
Permanent regulation rather than a temporary moratorium is
preferable, provided the legislation is sufficiently limited. A stable legal
environment best facilitates long-run planning and optimal cost
adjustment. From this consideration, adoption of a permanent but limited
conglomerate merger rule would be an improvement, for it would provide
a resolution of the continuing uncertainty surrounding the legal rule for
large conglomerate acquisitions.82 In view of the basic political and social
values involved, no permanent resolution seems possible without some
limitation on the magnitude of corporate mergers. 83
To assure that the risk of efficiency or incentive loss is minimized,
conglomerate merger legislation should be limited to large acquisitions by
firms of major economic size. Prohibition even of this limited group of
mergers should not be absolute, but except for certain leading firm
mergers, it would be subject to a divestiture of comparable assets defense.
To reduce the cost and add to the certainty of legal administration, other
affirmative defenses should, with one exception, be avoided. The exception
would be the acquisition of a failing or near-failing firm, where a test
similar to that used under the Bank Merger Law could be applied.84
The implications of this approach applied to the Senate bill are easily
specified. The first substantive provision of the bill, which would prevent
the merger of two firms each with sales or assets exceeding $2 billion,
appears appropriate as written (subject to a spin-off defense). Applicable
to only about 250 large firms, a merger of such proportions, creating a $4
billion firm, would place the merged enterprise within the approximately
65 largest industrial firms.85 Even under the questionable rationale that
conglomerate mergers capture important efficiencies and spur manage-
ment performance, there is reason to block a merger of such proportions.
The postmerger firm emerging from such a union will, by virtue of its own
augmented size, thereafter be immunized from involuntary take-over; and
82. The absence of such a rule is likely to lead to continued legislative efforts. Firms fearful of
legislative restrictions must make decisions based on the possibility of a future merger ban. This could
precipitate acquisitions that would otherwise be deferred. A stable legal environment would correct
this distorting incentive.
83. A law of this nature might also tend to preclude efforts to pass merger limitations applicable
to a specific industry, such as the pending proposals to limit acquisitions by large petroleum companies.
See Energy Antimonopoly Act of 1979, S. 1246,96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). Industry specific merger
legislation is less desirable since it necessarily suggests a legislativejudgment on the behavior, actual or
anticipated, of the firms involved. Even if one assumes the legislative premise to be correct, industry
specific legislation raises problems. Firms will afterwards behave in ways to avoid similar intrusions,
and become unduly responsive to government pressures of varying kinds. On the other hand a general
merger limitation does not have such inhibiting effect.
84. See Bank Merger Act, 12 U.S.C. §1828(c)(3) (1976) ("probable failure of one of the banks
involved [in mergers").
85. This group would be narrowed to approximately 50 industrial firms if size measurement
followed the FTC approach. See S. 600 Committee Hearings, supra note 12, at 250-51 (statement of
Alfred F. Dougherty, Jr.). The FTC uses the average of sales plus assets (sales plus assets divided by
two) to obtain a single index of size that would apply to firms that may either be capital intensive (high
assets) or sales intensive (high sales). Id. at 225-26.
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hence the assets involved will have been permanently removed from the
hypothetical market discipline.86 Thus, the prohibition on $2 billion
mergers could be rested solely on the rationale that mergers that shield
assets from possible future acquisition should be barred.
8 7
The second substantive provision of the Senate bill, covering mergers
between firms exceeding $350 million in sales or assets, appears too broad
since it would apply to any merger between firms in the "Fortune 500.""s
Viewing discretionary economic authority as a function of size, the smaller
firms within that group would seem of relatively lesser concern.8 9 The
Senate provision would make it difficult for the smaller firms within the
Fortune 500 to grow appreciably by merger, and would also to some
degree shield such firms from take-over even when the resulting firm would
not achieve immunizing size. 90 Focusing on what this author believes is the
primary concern of the legislation, application of the merger restriction
should be limited to acquisitions by firms having assets or sales exceeding
$3 billion of target firms having assets or sales of S350 million. Thus, the
prohibition would apply to an acquisition by the largest 100 firms of
one of the largest 500 industrials (or comparably sized firms).91
The third substantive provision of the Senate bill, which covers
leading firm acquisitions, should also be narrowed. As now written, the bill
would preclude acquisitions by firms having sales or assets exceeding $350
million of target firms having twenty percent or more of a market with
annual sales of at least $100 million. It is particularly important that this
provision be narrowed in view of the potential large scope of coverage and
because of the uncertainties that a test dependent on market definition
necessarily introduces. Thus an acquiring firm should be required to have
at least $2 billion in sales or assets (within or without the United States)
and the target market should have annual sales of at least $200 million (of
which the target firm would have to have at least twenty percent).
86. At precisely what size a firm becomes too large for successful take-over is uncertain, but S2
billion seems an appropriate dividing line. The largest previously attempted take-over was Occidental
Petroleum's tender offer to Mead Corporation (subsequently withdrawn), which involved a target firm
having S1.5 billion in assets and S2.3 billion in sales (and ranking 127th amongindustrial corporations
in total sales.) The Fortune Directory oftheSOO Largest US Industrial Corporations, FORTUNE. May 7,
1979, at 268.
87. Contrary to the Senate bill, however, it would be preferable to allow a spin-off defense even
to large acquisitions.
88. The Fortune Directory of the 500 Largest US Industrial Corporations, supra note 86.
89. This can be illustrated in terms of aggregate assets held. Thus, in 1974 the 200 largest firms
held 36.9% of all corporate assets and the 500 largest held 48.6%. Thus, the last 300 of the top 500 firms
held only 11.7% of corporate assets or less than one-third of that held by the first 200. See S. 600
Committee Hearings, supra note 12, at 86, Table 7 (statement of John H. Shenefield).
90. It would only shield smaller firms to some degree from take-over because merger would be
permitted when the acquiring firm made the required spin-off.
91. On the rationale of preventing acquisitions that permanently remove assets from further
take-over discipline a lower size for the acquiring firm could be justified, e.g. S2 billion. But since the
statutory theory is that political and social power is a function of size, there is nothing arbitrary in
directing the restraint at a smaller group of the largest corporations, i.e., the 100 largest non-financial
corporations holding 30.6% of non-financial assets. 1975. See S. 600 Committee Hearings, 311pra note
12, at 146 (statement of Alfred F. Dougherty, Jr.).
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The efficiencies and enhanced competitiveness defenses presently
contained in the Senate bill should be deleted as legally unworkable and
creating undue uncertainty. But acquisitions should be permitted when
one of the firms is failing or near-failing. Thus, a provision should be added
paralleling that contained in the Bank Merger Act, permitting acquisition
when necessary to prevent the probable failure of one of the firms.92
The spin-off provision should be retained and should be broadened to
apply to mergers of all size. Thus, a $2 billion firm could be acquired if
comparable assets were divested. This seems an essential adjustment to
assure that the possibility (however rare) that a large acquisition might
promote efficiencies through a synergic combination of the merging firms
is not lost.
9 3
92. See note 84 supra.
93. Indexing of size classifications to inflation also seems desirable to prevent future
overinclusion. The FTC proposal contains such a provision. See S. 600 Committee tlearings, supra




To preserve the diversity and independence of American business.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be
cited as the "Small and Independent Business Protection Act of 1979".
SEC. 2. Nothwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall
merge or consolidate with any other person engaged in commerce, or
acquire, directly or indirectly, such amount of the stock or other share
capital of such other person as to enable such person to control such other
person, or acquire, directly or indirectly, a majority of the assets of such
other person, if-
(a) each person has assets or sales exceeding $2,000,000,000;
(b) each person has assets or sales exceeding $350,000,000; or
(c) one person has assets or sales exceeding $350,000,000 and the
other person has 20 per centum or more of the sales during the
calendar year immediately preceding the acquisition in any significant
market.
SEC. 3. (a) Except as provided in subsection (b), it shall be an
affirmative defense to an offense under sections 2(b) and 2(c) that-
(1) the transaction will have the preponderant effect of
substantially enhancing competition;
(2) the transaction will result in substantial efficiencies; or
(3) within one year before or after the consummation of the
transaction, the parties thereto shall have divested one or more viable
business units, the assets and revenues of which are equal to or greater
than the assets and revenues of the smaller party to the transaction.
(b) Such affirmative defense shall not be available if one of the parties
to the transaction has within one year previous to the transaction been a
party to a prior transaction coming within the provisions of section 2(b) or
2(c).
SEC. 4. (a) Authority to enforce compliance with section 2 is vested in
the Attorney General of the United States and the Federal Trade
Commission.
(b) The Attorney General and the Federal Trade Commission shall
adopt procedures by which parties to a transaction within the terms of
sections 2(b) and 2(c) can ascertain the determination of the Attorney
General for the Federal Trade Commission as to whether or not the
transaction is within the terms of any of the affirmative defenses set forth in
section 3. If the Attorney General or Commission, pursuant to such
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procedures, advises a party that a transaction is within the terms of any of
the affirmative defenses set forth in section 3, the Attorney General and the
Federal Trade Commission shall be barred by such advice in the absence of
proof that the determination was based in whole or substantial part on an
intentional misstatement by the party requesting such advice.
SEC. 5. Injunctive relief for private parties may be granted under the
same terms and conditions as prescribed by section 16 of the Clayton Act.
DEFINITIONS
SEC. 6. (a) As used herein, "efficiencies" shall include economies of
scale in manufacturing, marketing, distribution, and research and
development.
(b) As used herein, "significant market" means any line of commerce
in any section of the country which has annual sales of more than
$100,000,000.
SEC. 7. (a) The provisions of this Act are in addition to and not in lieu
of other provisions of the antitrust laws and nothing in this Act shall be
deemed to authorize or make lawful anything heretofore prohibited or
made illegal by other antitrust laws.
(b) This Act shall apply to all mergers or consolidations occurring
after March 11, 1979.
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